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This paper deals with a core-equilibrium equivalence in an economy
with public goods where preferences of consumers display warm glow
e®ects. We demonstrate that provided that each consumer becomes
satiated to other consumers provision, it holds that, for a su±ciently
large economy, the set of Edgeworth allocations is non-empty. More-
over, we show that an Edgeworth allocation could be decentralized as
a warm glow equilibrium.
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11 Introduction
The seminal contribution of Debreu and Scarf (1963) shows that, in a pure
exchange economy, the core allocations shrink to the Walrasian equilibrium
as the set of consumers is appropriately enlarged. The core consists of allo-
cations of resources such that no coalition could achieve a preferred outcome
for its members by seceding from the grand coalition and proposing another
allocation that is reachable within its own resources. The Debreu and Scarf
contribution, which is a lucid formulation of an earlier conjecture by Edge-
worth (1881), has gained its prominence as a justi¯cation of the emergence
of competitive behavior as a result of social stability.
In economies with public goods, various attempts have been made to
investigate whether a similar core-equilibrium convergence holds for the Lin-
dahl price based mechanism. This is of a paramount importance, as it would
provide Lindahl equilibrium with the same solid foundation of competitive
equilibrium. Unfortunately, it turns out that this type of convergence is the
exception rather than the rule. The literature is furnished with either ro-
bust examples of non convergence (for example, see Muench (1972), Milleron
(1972) and Champsaur, Roberts and Rosenthal (1975)) or few context spe-
ci¯c convergences. This is hardly surprising since intuitively, unlike the case
of a pure exchange economy, potential blocking coalitions are more likely to
fall short of the resources available to the grand coalition to produce public
goods. Hence, unless the bene¯t of an ever-increasing public goods provision
is limited when the economy grows large, the core equilibrium convergence
is deemed to fail. The work of Wooders (1983) and Conley (1992) provide
valuable insights into economies with public goods where the above limita-
tion may hold. The game theoretic approach of Wooders (1983) imposes
the assumption of per capita boundedness on the equal treatment payo®s
of replica games to ensure the nonemptiness of an approximate limit core.
Conley (1992) evokes the possibility of asymptotic satiation in public goods
consumption due to the resulting colossal magnitude of the aggregate supply
of public goods in large replica economies.
More recently, Florenzano and del Mercato (2006) show a subtle conver-
gence of non standard core allocations to Lindahl equilibrium. Given the fact
that the set of core allocations is usually bigger than the Lindahl allocations,
Florenzano and del Mercato (2006) bypass this di±culty by constructing a
sequence of arti¯cial replica economies where public goods are normalized by
the size of the coalition providing it. More generally, as in the clubs/local
2public goods literature, where the public goods are subject to crowding and
congestion, the social stability underlying the formation of communities and
groups providing these goods will eventually settle the economy in a com-
petitive equilibrium (for example, see Wooders (1989, 1997) and Conley and
Smith (2005) for a survey).
The existence of Lindahl equilibrium in economies with public goods
was ¯rst formalized by Foley (1967, 1970) (see also Fabre-Sender (1969),
Milleron (1972), Roberts(1974), Bergstrom (1976) and Myles(1995)). Foely's
approach consists of embedding the public goods economy into a larger pri-
vate goods economy wherein each consumer is the only buyer of his own copy
of each public good. The existence of Lindahl is then established by resort-
ing to standard existence results for private goods economy. In the public
goods literature, lately, the warm glow model, where consumers receive a
direct utility for their own public goods provision, has been put forward by
Andreoni (1989, 1990) (see also Becker (1974), Cornes and Sandler (1984))
as a possible candid description of public goods provision. In a recent paper,
Allouch (2008) introduces a Lindahl-like competitive equilibrium for a warm
glow economy and provides the three fundamental theorems of general equi-
librium (the two Welfare Theorems and existence). It is worth noticing that
the warm glow equilibrium coincides with the Lindahl equilibrium if we con-
sider a standard formalization of utility functions. Then a natural question
arises, which is, \Under what circumstances the core allocations converge to
the warm glow equilibrium?"
Fortunately, one possible answer for the above question comes from the
literature on warm glow giving itself:
\For example, as the size of the population increases, choosing
a contribution level becomes more and more like picking the level
of consumption for any conventional good. In the limit, the con-
tributor simply weighs the relative merits of spending money on
two di®erent private goods, xi and gi; the e®ect on his well-being
through G becomes negligible."(p. 58, Bernheim and Rangel
(2005) \Behavioral public economics: welfare and policy anal-
ysis with non-standard decision makers"NBER Working Paper,
11518.)
And,
\Another way to see this intuitively is that, as the size of the
charity grows, all giving due to altruism will be crowded out,
3leaving only giving due to warm-glow. This accords naturally
with the observation that giving 100 dollars to an organization
that collects millions is motivated more by an admiration for the
organization than for any measurable e®ect of the marginal dona-
tion."(p. 1223, Andreoni (2006) \Philanthropy,"in the Handbook
of Giving, Reciprocity and Altruism.)
In this paper we attempt to articulate the above observations into an
economic assumption in order to establish that core allocations converge to
the warm glow equilibrium. Namely, we emphasize the fact that consumers
charitable giving, at some point, is more driven by the act of giving itself
rather than the aggregate provision of public goods, and thus increased pub-
lic goods provision by other consumers has no e®ect on a particular consumer
welfare. Stated Formally, our main economic assumption stipulates that, be-
yond a threshold of other consumers' public goods provision, each consumer
bene¯ts only from own public goods provision and private goods consump-
tion.
In the following, Section 2 is devoted to the model, Section 3 de¯nes
Edgeworth allocations and Section 4 shows the non-vacuity of the set of
Edgeworth allocations. In Section 5 we introduce the concept of warm glow
equilibrium and demonstrate our core-equilibrium equivalence result.
2 The model
We consider a public goods economy with i = 1;:::;N consumers, l =
1;:::;L private goods and k = 1;:::;K public goods. A consumption bundle
of private goods is denoted by x = (x1;:::;xL) 2 RL
+ and a consumption
bundle of public goods is denoted by g = (g1;:::;gK) 2 RK
+. The private and
public goods consumption set is R
L+K
+ ; for each consumer i. The production
technology for public goods is described by an aggregate production set Y ½
RL £ RK
+: A typical production plan will be written (y;g), where y 2 RL
denotes inputs of private goods and g 2 RK
+ denotes outputs of public goods.
Each consumer i has strictly positive endowments of private goods, denoted
by wi 2 RL
++; and has no endowments of public goods. The preferences
of each consumer i may be represented by a utility function ui(xi;gi;G¡i);
where xi is consumer's i private goods consumption, gi is consumer's i public
goods consumption, and G¡i =
P
j6=i gj is the total provision of public goods
4minus consumer's i provision. The utility function ui satis¯es the following
properties:
[A.1] Monotonicity: The utility function ui(¢;¢;¢) is increasing. More-
over, given any G¡i 2 RK




[A.2] Continuity: The utility function ui(¢;¢;¢) is continuous.
[A.3] Convexity: The utility function ui(¢;¢;¢) is quasi-concave.
[A.4] Warm glow indispensability: For every (xi;gi;G¡i) 2 R
L+K
+ , if
gi = 2 RK
++ then ui(xi;gi;G¡i) = infui(¢;¢;¢).
For simplicity, we consider a constant returns to scale technology. Thus,
we assume that Y is a closed convex cone with vertex the origin; satisfying
the usual conditions of irreversibility, no free production, and free disposal.
In addition, we assume the possibility of producing public goods, that is,
Y \ (RL £ RK
++) 6= ;, and that public goods are inessential in production,
that is, if (y;g1;:::;gK) 2 Y , then (y;supfg1;0g;:::;supfgK;0g) 2 Y:
3 Edgeworth allocations









For simplicity of notations, an N-feasible allocation will be simply called a
feasible allocation.
A coalition S ½ N can improve upon an allocation ((xi;gi);i 2 N) if




gj) > ui(xi;gi;G¡i); for each consumer i 2 S:
That is to say, coalition S could do better for its members by breaking away
from the grand coalition and proposing another allocation that is feasible
with its own available resources. An allocation ((xi;gi);i 2 N) is in the core
if it is feasible and cannot be improved upon by any coalition S ½ N.
5For each positive integer r; we de¯ne the rth replica economy, denoted by
Er; as the economy with a set of consumers
Nr = f(i;q) j i = 1;:::;N and q = 1;:::;rg:
Consumer (i;q) is called the qth consumer of type i. It will be the case
that all consumers of type i are identical in terms of their consumption sets,
endowments and preferences to consumer i. Let S be a non-empty subset of








For each integer r; we de¯ne the rth replica of allocation ((xi;gi);i 2 N);
denoted by ((x(i;q);g(i;q));(i;q) 2 Nr); as follows:
x(i;q) = xi and g(i;q) = gi; for each (i;q) 2 Nr
That is, in the rth replica economy Er, each of the rth replica consumers of
type i has the same private goods and public goods consumption as consumer
i.
An allocation ((xi;gi);i 2 N) is an Edgeworth allocation, if for each posi-
tive integer r, the rth replica of ((xi;gi);i 2 N) is in the core of the rth replica
economy Er.
3.1 Non-vacuity of the set of Edgeworth allocations
Brenheim and Rangel (2005) and Andreoni (2006) argues that asymptotically
consumers charitable giving is more due to the act of giving itself rather than
concerns about the aggregate provision of public goods. Our main economic
assumption attempts to formalize the above intuition.
[WGD] Warm glow dominance1 For every consumer i 2 N, there
exists a bundle public goods G¤
¡i 2 RK
++; such that for all (xi;gi;G¡i) 2
R
L+2K




1We borrowed this term from Andreoni (2006).
6The [WGD] assumption ensures that beyond a public goods bundle2 for other
consumers' provision, each consumer receives utility only from his public
goods provision and his private goods consumption. It is worth noticing that
the [WGD] assumption does not imply the asymptotic satiation assumption
in public goods of Conley (1994) since the utility functions could still be
unbounded due to an ever-increasing own provision of public goods.
Our theorem below states that, for a su±ciently large replica, an Edge-
worth allocation exists.
Theorem 1. Assume [A.1]-[A.4] and [WGD]. Then, there exists a positive
integer r¤ such that the set of Edgeworth allocation for the r¤ replica economy
Er¤ is non-empty.
Proof. We ¯rst construct an auxiliary private goods production economy
^ E with N consumers. Each consumer i is described by a consumption set
R
L+K
+ , an endowment (wi;0) 2 R
L+K
+ ; and a utility function ^ ui de¯ned as
follows
^ ui(xi;gi) = ui(xi;gi;G
¤
¡i); for all (xi;gi) 2 R
L+K
+ :
The production technology of the auxiliary economy ^ E is characterized by
the production set Y: Hence, it is obvious that the set of feasible allocations
of the auxiliary economy ^ E coincides with the set of feasible allocations of
the economy E:
From standard results for the non-vacuity of the set of Edgeworth allo-
cations for private goods production economies (for example, see Florenzano
(1990, 2003)) it follows that there exists an Edgeworth allocation ((xi;gi);i 2 N)
for the economy ^ E. Then, by warm glow indispensability and possibility of
producing public goods assumptions, it follows that gi 2 RK
++: Therefore, we
can choose an r¤ such that (r¤ ¡ 1)gi ¸ G¤
¡i, for every consumer i. Hence,
it is easy to check that for the allocation ((x(i;q);g(i;q));(i;q) 2 Nr¤), the r¤
replica of ((xi;gi);i 2 N); it holds that ui(x(i;q);g(i;q);G¡(i;q)) = ^ ui(xi;gi):
We claim that ((x(i;q);g(i;q));(i;q) 2 Nr¤) is in an Edgeworth alloca-
tion of the economy Er¤. Suppose not. Then, there exists a positive in-
teger n; and a coalition S ½ Nnr¤ that can improve upon the nth replica
of ((x(i;q);g(i;q));(i;q) 2 Nr¤). Thus, there exists an S-feasible allocation
2This public goods bundle may not be feasible in the economy.




gj) > ui(x(i;q);g(i;q);G¡(i;q)); for all (i;q) 2 S:
By the de¯nition of the utility functions ^ ui, it holds that
^ ui(x(i;q);g(i;q)) ¸ ui(x(i;q);g(i;q);
X
j2Snf(i;q)g
gj); for all (i;q) 2 S:
Hence,
^ ui(x(i;q);g(i;q)) > ^ ui(xi;gi); for all (i;q) 2 S:
This contradicts the fact that ((xi;gi);i 2 N) is an Edgeworth allocation for
the auxiliary economy e E: Hence, ((xi;q;gi;q);(i;q) 2 Nr¤) is an Edgeworth
allocation for the economy Er¤:¤
4 Warm glow equilibrium
In a recent paper, Allouch (2008) introduces the warm glow equilibrium con-
cept as a competitive equilibrium for a warm glow economy.3 In a warm
glow equilibrium each consumer faces a common price for the private goods,
a personalized price for his own public goods provision, and another person-
alized price for other consumers's public goods provision. These personalized
prices arise due to the externalities brought about by each consumer public
goods provision.
De¯nition: A warm glow equilibrium is ((xi;gi;¼i;¼¡i)i2N;p;pg), where
((xi;gi);i 2 N) is a feasible allocation, p 2 RL
+ is a price system for private
goods, pg 2 RK
+ a price system for public goods, ¼i 2 RK
+ is the personalized
price of consumer's i own public goods provision, and ¼¡i 2 RK
+; is consumer's
i personalized price for other consumers' public goods provision.
(i). For all (y;g) 2 Y;
(p;p








3It is worth noticing that the warm glow equilibrium coincides with the Lindahl equi-
librium if we consider the standard public good model, where preferences of consumer i
are represented by the utility function ui(xi;gi + G¡i) instead of ui(xi;gi;G¡i):
8(ii). for each consumer i 2 N;




p ¢ xi + ¼i ¢ gi + ¼¡i ¢ G¡i > p ¢ wi;






Condition (i) is the pro¯t maximization, Condition (ii) is the utility max-
imization and Condition (iii) ensures the personalized prices sum up to the
public goods prices.
We now show that warm glow equilibrium is in the core.
Theorem 2. If ((xi;gi;¼i;¼¡i)i2N;p;pg) is a warm glow equilibrium, then
((xi;gi);i 2 N) is in the core.
Proof. First, it follows from the de¯nition of warm glow equilibrium that
((xi;gi);i 2 N) is feasible. Now, suppose that there is a coalition S ½ N and





i(xi;gi;G¡i); for each i 2 S
From (ii) in the de¯nition of warm glow equilibrium, for each consumer i, it
holds that
p ¢ xi + ¼i ¢ gi + ¼¡i ¢
X
j2Snfig
gj > p ¢ wi:
Summing up the above inequalities over i 2 S, it holds that
X
i2S






¼¡j) ¢ gi >
X
i2S
p ¢ wi: (1)
9Now, we extend the allocation ((xi;gi);i 2 S) in the following way. For each
i = 2 S, we set (xi;gi) = (wi;0): Since ((xi;gi);i 2 S) is an S-feasible allocation
it follows that ((xi;gi);i 2 N) is a feasible allocation.
Then, (1) implies that
X
i2N










Since pg = ¼i +
P









which contradicts (i) in the de¯nition of equilibrium :¤
Now, we state our main existence theorem, where we decentralize an
Edgeworth allocation as a warm glow equilibrium.
Theorem 3. Assume [A.1]-[A.4] and [WGD]. Then, there exists a positive
integer r¤, such that the r¤ replica economy Er¤ has a warm glow equilibrium
Proof. From Theorem 1, there exists a positive integer r¤, such that the
set of Edgeworth allocations is non-empty in the economy Er¤: For simplic-
ity of notations, we can assume that r¤ = 1 and let ((xi;gi);i 2 N) be an
Edgeworth allocation for E1:
In the following, we expand the economy in the spirit of Foley (1970).
However, our decentralization argument di®ers from Foley's since we expand
the economy in a speci¯c way in order to take account of warm glow e®ects
in preferences. We also consider individual consumers' preferred sets rather
than an aggregate preferred set for the economy. For each consumer i, we
de¯ne the set ¡i ½ RL+2NK; where N is the set of consumers, L is the number
of private goods and K is the number of public goods, as follows:
¡i = f(xi ¡ wi;0;:::;gi;G¡i;:::;0) j ui(xi;gi;G¡i) > ui(xi;gi;G¡i)g
The set ¡i is consumer i's expanded preferred set, listing his net trade in
private goods, his public goods provision and other consumers' public goods
provision. Since [A.1], ¡i is non empty for each consumer i. In addition, it is
10easy to check that the convexity of the preferences implies that ¡i is convex
for each consumer i. Let ¡ denote the convex hull of the union of the sets
¡i, i = 1;:::;N.
Now, we de¯ne the set:






gj) 2 Y g:
The set e Y is a convex cone with vertex the origin since Y is a convex cone
with vertex the origin. We claim that
¡ \ e Y = ;:
To see this, assume, on the contrary, that ¡ \ e Y 6= ;: Then, there exists
(xi ¡ wi;0;:::;gi;G¡i;:::;0) 2 ¡i and ¸ 2 RN
+ such that
P
i ¸i = 1; and
X
¸i(xi ¡ wi;0;:::;gi;G¡i;:::;0) 2 e Y :
Let S = fi j ¸i > 0g. It is obvious that S 6= ; since
P
i ¸i = 1. For each
i 2 S and each positive integer n; let ni be the smallest integer which is





















¡i) > ui(xi;gi;G¡i); for each i 2 S:




















¡i;:::;0) 2 e Y :









¡i;:::;0) 2 e Y :
11Thus, we have constructed a blocking coalition, which is a contradiction to
the assumption that ((xi;gi);i 2 N) is an Edgeworth allocation. Therefore,
¡ \ e Y = ;:
From Minkowski's separating hyperplane theorem, there exists a hyper-
plane with normal (p;¼1;¼¡1;:::;¼N;¼¡N) 6= 0; and a scalar r such that
(i). for all (y;g1;G¡1;:::;gN;G¡N) 2 ¡
(p;¼1;¼¡1;:::;¼N;¼¡N) ¢ (y;g1;G¡1;:::;gN;G¡N) ¸ r:
(ii). for all (y;g1;G¡1;:::;gN;G¡N) 2 e Y
(p;¼1;¼¡1;:::;¼N;¼¡N) ¢ (y;g1;G¡1;:::;gN;G¡N) · r;
Since e Y is a closed convex cone with vertex zero, we can choose r = 0. It
follows from (i) in the separation theorem that for any consumer i, and any
consumption bundle (xi;gi;G¡i) such that ui(xi;gi;G¡i) > ui(xi;gi;G¡i); it
holds that
p ¢ (xi ¡ wi) + ¼i ¢ gi + ¼¡i ¢ G¡i ¸ 0: (3)
Thus, by continuity and monotonicity of preferences with respect to private
goods, we obtain
p ¢ (xi ¡ wi) + ¼i ¢ gi + ¼¡i ¢ G¡i ¸ 0
Summing up over the consumers and rearranging terms, we get
(p;¼1;¼¡1;:::;¼N;¼¡N) ¢ (
X
(xi ¡ wi);g1;G¡1;:::;gN;G¡N) ¸ 0: (4)




(xi ¡ wi);g1;G¡1;:::;gN;G¡N) · 0: (5)
Hence, it follows from (4) and (5) that
12(p;¼1;¼¡1;:::;¼N;¼¡N) ¢ (
X
(xi ¡ wi);g1;G¡1;:::;gN;G¡N) = 0: (6)
And, therefore
p ¢ (xi ¡ wi) + ¼i ¢ gi + ¼¡i ¢ G¡i = 0: (7)








Suppose this was not the case, then, without loss of generality, one could
















Let ±k be a vector in RK
+ consisting of one unit of the kth public good and













j1 = gj1 ¡ "±k;
g"
j2 = gj2 + "±k;
g"
i = gi; if i 2 N n fj1;j2g:











¡N) 2 e Y :












but, this contradicts property (i) of the separation theorem. Thus, we set up
p
g = ¼i +
X
j6=i
¼¡j; for all i 2 N:
13In view of this, property (ii) of the separation theorem and (6) imply that
for all (y;g) 2 Y;
(p;p








This proves (i) and (iii) in the de¯nition of warm glow equilibrium.
From [A.1] and the separation theorem it follows that p 2 RL
+ n f0g
and for each consumer i, (¼i;¼¡i) 2 RK
+ n f0g £ RK
+: Now, we show that
for any consumer i and any consumption bundle (xi;gi;G¡i); such that
ui(xi;gi;G¡i) > ui(xi;gi;G¡i); it holds that
p ¢ xi + ¼i ¢ gi + ¼¡i ¢ G¡i > p ¢ wi:
Assume that this was not the case. By indispensability of warm glow pro-
vision, it follows that gi 2 RK




i << gi: Therefore, by quasi-concavity and continuity, along the line join-
ing (xi;g0
i;G¡i) and (xi;gi;G¡i); there is a point in the consumption set of i
which is strictly preferred to (xi;gi;G¡i) and costs strictly less than p ¢ wi.
This contradicts (3). This and (7) prove (ii) in the de¯nition of warm glow
equilibrium:¤
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